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The  view  that  monetary  and  financial 
aggregates are important determinants of 
economic  performance  is  widely  accepted  by 
policyrnakers, economists, and  other  analysts. 
For this reason, there is general agreement that 
the  Federal  Reserve  System  ought  to  use 
monetary  policy  instruments  to influence the 
behavior  of  these  aggregates.  There  is  no 
consensus,  though,  regarding  which  of  the 
aggregates  should  be  emphasized  in  the 
conduct of  monetary  policy.  The  Federal 
Reserve  has  not  selected  a  single  aggregate; 
instead, policy actions are designed to influence 
the  behavior  of  several  monetary  aggregates. 
This article analyzes conditions in  which  it  is 
desirable to  establish  target  growth  rates  for 
more  than  one  monetary  aggregate  and 
discusses the implications of  following such  a 
practice. 
The first section provides a brief description 
of  the current procedure used  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  to  implement  monetary  policy.  The 
second section discusses one possible reason for 
establishing  multiple  monetary  targets.  It  is 
demonstrated  that  uncertainty  about  which 
monetary aggregate is most useful as a guide to 
the  conduct of  monetary  policy  would  justify 
the  use  of  multiple  targets.  A  weighting 
procedure for establishing consistent monetary 
targets that reflects this type of  uncertainty is 
then discussed.  In  the third  section,  an 
alternative  reason  for  the  use  of  multiple 
targets is.analyzed. It is shown that targets for 
more  than  one  monetary aggregate would  be 
appropriate  if  different  types  of  assets  have 
different effects on the economy.  A  weighting 
procedure for  setting  consistent  targets  that 
reflects the relative magnitude of  the economic 
impact  of  different  types  of  assets. is  also 
analyzed. The article concludes by  contrasting 
the policy  implications  of  the alternative 
reasons  for  establishing  multiple  targets  and 
compares the policy procedures implied by the 
use of multiple targets to the current method of 
implementing monetary policy. 
THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR 
IMPLEMENTING MONETARY POLICY 
In recent  years,  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee (FOMC) has progressively empha- 
sized  the  role  of  monetary aggregates in  the 
implementation of monetary policy. Since early 
-1975, the FOMC has each  quarter established 
annual .growth ranges  for  MI, M2,  and  M3 
that  are  believed  to  be  consistent  with  the 
economic goals of the Federal Reserve System.' 
1 MI is composed of currency and demand deposits held by 
the  nonbank  public.  M2 includes  time  deposits  at 
commercial banks (other than large negotiable certificates 
of deposit at weekly reporting banks) in addition to the MI 
assets. M3 includes M2  assets plus time deposits at  thrift 
institutions. At  the  October  1977  FOMC  meeting,  for 
example, growth ranges of 4 to 6% per cent for 
MI, 6% to 9 per cent for M2, and 8 to 10% 
per cent for M3 were established for the period 
from  the third  quarter  of  1977  to the  third 
quarter of 1978. 
The FOMC attempts to achieve its long-term 
monetary objectives  by  providing for financial 
conditions that keep the  monetary aggregates 
on  paths  consistent with the long-run  growth 
ranges. The FOMC meets once each month to 
determine the monetary policy most conducive 
to  the  attainment  of  its  long-run  monetary 
objectives. The desired policy is conveyed to the 
manager of the System open market account in 
the  policy  directive  issued  after  each  FOMC 
meeting. 
The policy directive as currently formulated 
includes  2-month  growth  ranges  for  M1 and 
M2  thought  to be  reasonably  consistent with 
the long-run  growth  ranges.  A Federal funds 
rate objective is also stipulated in the directive. 
The  Federal  funds  rate  is  the  primary 
operational variable  used  by  the account 
manager to influence monetary growth. Other 
things being equal, there tends to be an inverse 
relation between monetary growth rates and the 
Federal  funds  rate.  The  Federal  funds  rate 
objective described in the policy directive is the 
FOMC's  estimate  of  the  rate  necessary  to 
achieve the desired short-run monetary growth 
rates. 
The Federal funds rate objective contained in 
the  directive  sometimes  proves  to  be 
inconsistent with  the  short-run  M1  and  M2 
growth  ranges,  however.  New  information  on 
the monetary aggregates becomes available to 
the account manager every  week.  If  the  new 
data  indicate  that  the  initial  estimates  of 
monetary  growth  rates  resulting  from  the 
Federal  funds  rate  specified  in  the  policy 
directive were  mistaken, the account manager 
must determine how  to adjust the funds rate to 
comply  with  the  wishes  of  the  FOMC.  The 
policy directive contains a rule for adjusting the 
Federal funds rate within a specified range in 
response  to  incoming. 'monetary  data.  The 
account manager is authorized to increase the 
funds  rate  when  monetary  growth  is 
significantly above the desired  growth and to 
lower the funds rate when  monetary growth is 
significantly below the desired growth. 
Deviations from desired M1 and M2 growth 
rates are not always of  the same magnitude nor 
in  the same direction.  The account  manager, 
therefore,  must  know  the  relative  priorities 
assigned to attainment of  the desired monetary 
growth  rates  in  order  to  determine  the 
appropriate  policy  response. For the past  two 
years, the  FOMC  has  instructed  the  account 
manager to give equal weight to M1 and M2 in 
determining  the  Federal  funds  rate  that  is 
consistent with policy objectives. 
In  summary,  the  Federal  Reserve  takes 
account of  the  behavior  of  several  monetary 
aggregates  in  formulating  monetary  policy, 
with  M1  and  M2  receiving  the  greatest 
attention. The behavior of monetary aggregates 
is  influenced by  taking policy actions to keep 
the growth rates of Ml and M2 within specified 
ratges. Although these growth rate ranges are 
frequently referred  to as  monetary targets  by 
policy  observers,  the  current  procedure  for 
implementing  monetary  policy  is  not  strictly 
equivalent to  the  use  of  monetary  aggregate 
targets.'  In precise terms, a policy target is an 
economic variable whose value is kept on some 
predetermined path regardless of  the behavior 
of  other economic variables.  The M1 and M2 
growth  ranges  are  not  policy  targets  by  this 
For  a thorough  discussion of the current procedure for 
implementing monetary  policy and its resemblance to the 
use of  intermediate targets, see  Benjamin M. Friedman, 
"Targets,  Instruments,  and  Indicators of  Monetary 
Policy," Journal of  Monetary  Economics. Vol.  1, No.  4 
(1975). 
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factors  contribute  to  the  Federal  Reserve's 
policy decisions. 
Current  procedures  for  implementing 
monetary  policy  do  resemble  the  use  of 
monetary  targets  in  many  respects,  however. 
Accordingly,  the  theoretical  analysis  in  the 
remainder of  this article proceeds as if  policy 
were  conducted  in  a  manner  that  conforms 
precisely to the use of  monetary targets, even 
though the theoretical discussion is not directly 
applicable  to  the  way  the  Federal  Reserve 
conducts monetary policy at the present time. 
Although M1 and M2 are frequently thought of 
as mutually exclusive policy targets, there are a 
number  of  reasons  for  using  both  in 
formulating monetary  policy.  Two  alternative 
reasons  for  establishing  both  M1  and  M2 
targets are discussed  below.  It is  then shown 
how  the M1 and M2 target growth rates most 
conducive  to  attainment  of  ultimate  policy 
goals might be determined in each case if  the 
Federal Reserve were to adopt procedures that 
are equivalent to the use of  M1 and M2 targets 
as  the  sole  determinants  of  short-run  policy 
decisions. 
ESTABLISHING MULTIPLE TARGETS 
BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY 
It  might  be  desirable  to  establish  target 
growth  rates for  both  M1 and  M2 if  there  is 
uncertainty about which aggregate is  the most 
effective  policy  guide.  For  a  monetary 
aggregate to serve as an effective guide for the 
conduct of  monetary policy, it must be closely 
related  to  ultimate  policy  goals.  A  good 
summary  measure of  the  numerous  goals  of 
monetary policy is the rate of  growth of current 
dollar or  nominal gross  national  product 
(GNP). Achieving a  GNP growth  rate that is 
consistent  with  high  employment  and 
reasonable price stability may  be considered to 
be the primary goal of  monetary policy.  For a 
monetary aggregate to be a useful policy guide, 
therefore, it must be so closely related to GNP 
that  achieving a  certain  growth  rate  for  the 
aggregate can be relied  upon  to result in  the 
desired growth in GNP. 
A Method for Determining Desirable 
M1 and M2 Growth Rates 
One commonly used method of  determining 
the closeness of  the relation between GNP and 
M1  or  M2  is  to  estimate  empirically  the 
parameters  of  reduced  form  equations  that 
include either  M1  or  M2 as  an independent 
variable.  A  reduced  form  GNP equation 
directly  measures  the  relation  between  GNP 
and  one  or  more  policy-related  variables.  A 
highly simplified  reduced form equation  with 
M1 as an independent variable is: 
(1)  GNP = ag + a1 MI, 
wbere GNP is the growth rate of  nominal GNP; 
MI is the growth rate of MI, and ag and a1 are 
the parameters. 
Numerical estimates of the parameters of the 
reduced  form  GNP/Ml  equation  can  be 
obtained  using  multiple  regression  analysis. 
Having obtained the parameter estimates,  the 
reduced form equation,can be used  to predict 
the GNP growth rate resulting from any given 
M1 growth  rate.  Comparison  of  actual  GNP 
growth  rates  with  those  predicted  by  the 
equation indicates the closeness of  the relation 
between  M1  and  GNP.  The  lower  are  the 
magnitude  and  variability  of  differences 
between  predicted  and  actual  GNP  growth 
rates, the closer is the relation between M1 and 
GNP.  A  similar  procedure  can  be  used  to 
determine the closeness of the relation between 
M2 and GNP. A  primary reason why  there  is  uncertainty 
about whether. M1 or M2 is  the better  policy 
guide is  that studies  using  the reduced  form 
approach  have  been  unable  to  demonstrate 
conclusively  that  either  M1  or  M2  is  more 
closely related to GNP in all  circumstance^.^ In 
some time periods, M1 appears to  have been 
more  closely  related  to  GNP,  while  in  other 
periods,:M2 appears to have been more closely 
related to GNP. Thus, the question of  whether 
M1  or  M2 is  the  more  useful  policy  guide 
remains unresolved. This uncerjainty regarding 
which monetary aggregate is the more effective 
policy  guide provides  one  possible  reason  for 
establishing target  growth  rates  for  both  MI 
and M2. 
The reduced form approach can also be used 
to derive target growth rates for  M1 and M2. 
To illustrate,  assume  that the desired  growth 
rate  of  GNP  is  12  per  cent  and  that  the 
following  estimates  of  the  relations  between 
GNP and  M1  and  M2 grokh rates are relied 
on in setting targets:' 
and 
3 Recent estimates of reduced form relations can be found 
in  Michael Hamburger, "Behavior of the Money Stock: Is 
There a Puzzle?"  Journal of  Monetary Economics,  Vol. 3, 
No. 3 (1977). 
The reduced form relations used throughout  this article 
include only the current value of a monetary aggregate as 
an independent variable. Most reduced form equations are 
substantially  more  complex  than  this.  Regardless  of 
how complex the reduced form equation that is estimated, 
however, it  is  always possible to derive  a  simple relation 
between the current  growth  rate of  a  monetary aggregate 
and the current growth rate of GNP so long as the values of 
other explanatory variables  are  known. Thus, the simple 
relations  assumed  in  this  article  involve  no  loss  in 
generality; the basic procedure analyzed in the article could 
be  used  regardless  of  the  complexity  of  the  estimated 
reduced form equation. 
The relation in (2) indicates that a 6 per cent 
M1  growth  rate  is  required  to  achieve  the 
desired 12 per cent growth rate in GNP (i.e., 12 
= 6.0 + (1.0)  (6)). Similarly, the relation in 
(3) indicates that a 10 per cent M2 growth rate 
is required (i.e., 12 = 7.0 + (0.5)  (10)). These 
estimates imply that a  monetary policy  based 
on target growth rates of 6 per cent for M1 and 
10 per cent for M2 would be most conducive to 
attainment of  ultimate policy objectives. 
Choosing Targets When MI  and M2 
Growth Rates are Interdependent 
The analysis of the procedure for establishing 
M1  and  M2 targets  outlined  above  assumed 
that  monetary  targets  could  be  chosen 
independently. This assumption is unwarranted 
when M1 and M2 growth rates are interrelated, 
that is, when  a  particular  growth  rate in one 
monetary  aggregate tends to be  accompanied 
by  a certain growth rate in  the other.  In these 
circumstances, the  procedure for  establishing 
monetary targets must be amended to allow for 
the  interdependence  between  M1  and  M2 
growth rates. 
Interdependence between M1 and M2  growth 
rates  arises  to  the  extent  that  there  are  an 
insufficient  number of  policy  instruments 
available  for  use  in  achieving  short-run 
monetary  objectives.  There  are  a  number  of 
monetary  policy  instruments,  such  as  reserve 
requirements and open market operations, that 
are controlled by  the Federal Reserve.  Each of 
these  instruments  has  a  somewhat  different 
impact on  M1 growth than on  M2 growth.  It 
would  be  possible  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to 
achieve  independently  chosen  M1  and  M2 
growth  rates if  all of  these policy  instruments 
were  effective  tools  of  short-run  monetary 
control. Many  of  the  policy  instruments, 
however,  are  not  effective  for  achieving 
6  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Economic Review  February 1978 short-run  monetary  objectives.  It may  be 
impractical,  for instance, to vary  reserve 
requirements  on  member  bank  deposits 
frequently  enough  for  changes  in  reserve 
requirements  to  contribute  to  short-run 
monetary  control.  The  adjustment  costs 
incurred  by  banks  in  responding  to frequent 
changes  in  reserve  requirements  may  be 
considered too high a price to pay for marginal 
improvement in  achieving short-run  monetary 
objectives.  Due  to the limited  short-run 
effectiveness of many of  the~policy  instruments, 
the  Federal  Reserve  has  relied  primarily  on 
open  market  operations  to  achieve  desired 
short-run monetary growth rates. 
The'relative growth rates of  M1 and M2  that 
result from a particular open market operation 
depend  on  choices  of  commercial  banks  and 
the public that are largely beyond the control of 
policy  actions.  For  this  reason,  open  market 
operations designed to affect the growth rate of 
one  monetary aggregate necessarily affect  the 
growth rate of  the other. Thus, there results an 
interdependence between  M1 and  M2 growth 
rates. 
When  the  reason  for establishing both  M1 
and  M2 targets  is  uncertainty as  to which  is 
more closely  related to GNP,  the interdepen- 
dence between monetary growth rates necessi- 
tates a  compromise  between  the M1 and  M2 
target gro&h  rates that would be established if 
targets  could  be  chosen  independently.  The 
need  to compromise can  be demonstrated  by 
reference to the example discussed previously. 
As  was  demonstrated,  the  relation  in  (2) 
indicates that a 6 per cent M1 growth rate is 
required  to  achieve  the  desired  12 per  cent 
growth  rate in  GNP,  and  the  relation  in (3) 
indicates that a 10  per cent M2  growth rate is 
required  to achieve  the  desired  GNP  growth 
rate.  M1 growth  of  6 per  cent  may  not  be 
consistent  with  M2 growth  of  10  per  cent, 
however.  Assume,  for  instance,  that  the 
estimated relation between M1 and M2  growth 
rates is: 
(4)  ~2 = 4.5 + 1.5  ~l. 
This relation  indicates that open  market 
operations  necessary  to attain  a  6  per  cent 
growth rate for M1 would inevitably lead to an 
M2  growth rate of  13.5 per cent (M2 = 4.5 + 
1.5  MI  = 4.5 +  (1.5)  (6) = 13.5).  Similarly, 
open market operations necessary to attain a 10 
per cent M2  growth rate would yield M1  growth 
of less than 4  per cent. Since it is impossible to 
attain the desired combination of  M1 and M2 
growth rates that are derived from the reduced 
form  relations between  GNP and  M1 or M2, 
setting target growth rates for M1 and M2  by 
using only the reduced  form  equations would 
result  in  inconsistent short-run  monetary 
objectives. 
Weighting MI  and M2 to Ensure 
Consistent Targets 
The  inconsistency between desired M1 and 
M2 growth rates may  be  resolved  by ,using a 
weighting  scheme  that  reflects  the 'relative 
importance attached  to M1 and  M2  as policy 
guides.  Resolution  of  the  inconsistency 
necessitates a compromise in one or both of the 
desired  monetary  growth  rates,  however. 
Suppose, for  example,  the weighting  scheme 
indicates  that  M1  is  considered  to  be  very 
important  and  that  M2  is  believed  to  have 
little, if any, significance. In this case, the M1 
target would be set equal to the M1 growth rate 
believed  necessary to achieve  ultimate  policy 
goals.  The  corresponding  M2 target  would 
necessarily  be the M2  growth rate that would 
result from policy actions necessary to achieve 
the  Ml starget.  In  terms  of  the  previous 
example, total reliance on M1 as a policy guide 
would  result in an M1 target growth rate of  6 per cent and an M2 target growth rate of  13.5 
per cent.5 
A monetary policy based on exclusive use of 
M1 as a policy guide would result in attainment 
of  ultimate policy goals if the relation between 
M1 and !GNP proves to be valid in the period 
for which  monetary targets are established. If 
(2) proves  to be an accurate. representation of 
the relation between GNP and M2 in the period 
for which targets are established, achieving the 
6 per cent target growth rate in M1 would lead 
to the  desired  12  per  cent  growth  in  GNP. 
However, large policy errors would result if  the 
confidence in M1 as a policy guide proves to be 
unfounded and, instead,  the  relation between 
GNP and M2 is valid. The 13.5 per cent growth 
in M2 that necessarily accompanies M1 growth 
of 6 per cent would, according to the estimated 
relation between M2 and GNP in  (3), result in 
GNP growth  of  13.75  per  cent,  substantially 
above the desired 12 per cent GNP growth rate. 
Similarly,  exclusive' reliance  on  M2  as  a 
policy guide would lead to the desired growth in 
GNP  if  the  relation  between  M2  and  GNP 
proves to be valid.  If  the relation betweenxM2 
and  GNP  in  (3)  accurately  represents  the 
influence  of  policy  actions  on  the  economy, 
achieving a  10  per  cent  growth  rate  in  M2 
would result in the-desired 12 per cent growth 
in  GNP. If the relation between  M1 and GNP 
proves. to be  accurate,  however,  large  policy 
errors would  result from exclusive  reliance :on 
M2  as  .a  policy guide.  The  3.67 per  cent  M1 
growth  rate that  necessarily  accompanies  M2 
SThe M2  target  would  be supeffluous  if  the conduct  of 
policy were dictated entirely by the desire to achieve an M1 
growth rate believed to be consistent  with ultimate policy 
goals. This example of setting targets for both, aggregates, 
even though only one of the targets has any significance for 
the conduct of policy, is discussed for illustrative purposes 
only. The targets resulting from  exclusive reliance on one 
aggregate provide an interesting contrast to targets 
resulting from partial  reliance on  both aggregates,  a case 
that is discussed later. 
growth  of  10  per  cent  would  lead  to  GNP 
growth of  only  9.67 per  cent according to the 
relation  in  (2).  well  below  the  desired  GNP 
growth  rate  of  12  per  cent.  Thus,  exclusive 
reliance on  either  M1  or  M2  would  lead  to 
substantial  deviation  from  >the desired  GNP 
growth  rate  if  the  confidence in  the  relation 
between  GNP and  the  aggregate chosen  as a 
policy guide proves to be unfounded. 
As an alternative to exclusive reliance'on one 
aggregate,  the  weighting  procedure  used .to 
ensure the consistency of  M1  and  M2  targets 
could reflect partial reliance on each aggregate. 
In this case, the potential impact of  both M1 
and M2 on GNP would  be taken into account 
to some degree in establishing  target^.^ The M1 
and M2 targets resulting from  partial reliance 
on each aggregate would not be the same as the 
targets resulting from  total  reliance on  either 
aggregate. The M1 target resulting from partial 
reliance on each  aggregate would  be between 
the 3.67 per cent target growth rate that would 
'  t 
The  same  weighting  procedure  used  to  establiih  the 
monetary  targets  initially  can  be  used  to determine  the 
appropriate  policy  response  to  deviations  from  those 
targets. In general, a  policy response will be elicited if  the 
growth  rate  of  either  aggregate  diffen  from  its'  target 
growth  rate.  Open  market  operations  intended  to 
counteract the divergence between the actual and desired 
growth rates for one aggregate necessarily affect the growth 
rate of the other aggregate. Thus, the same type of conflict 
between >monetary  objectives that  necessitated  the  initial 
weighting  procedure  used  to .establish  consistent  targets 
arises when responding to deviations, from the established 
targets.  The same  reasoning  that  leads to weighting M1 
and  M2 in  determining  the appropriate set  of  monetary 
targets also leads to weighting deviations from those targets 
in  determining  the  appropriate  policy  response  to 
unexpected behavior of  one or both  monetary aggregates. 
The determinants of the relative weights are also the same 
in the two cases. The relative priorities assigned to reducing 
deviations from M1 and M2  targets would be based on the 
relative confidence  in  the  closeness of  their  relations  to 
GNP.  If  M1 were  considered  a  much  better  policy guide 
than  M2,  for  example,  open  market  policy  would  be 
designed to maintain the M1 growth rate close to its target 
even though this policy might cause substantial deviation of 
the M2  growth rate from its target. 
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M2 as a policy guide and the 6 per cent target 
growth rate that would  be established if  total 
reliance were placed on  M1 as a policy guide. 
Similarly, the M2 target resulting from partial 
reliance on  each  aggregate would  be between 
the 10 per cent and 13.5 per cent target growth 
rates that would be established if total reliance 
were placed on one aggregate or the other. The 
greater the weight given to M1 relative to M2, 
for instance, the closer would  be the M1 target 
to 6 per cent and the further would  be the M2 
target from 10 per cent. 
Partial  reliance on  each  aggregate  reduces 
the  possibility  of  major  policy  errors.  To 
illustrate,  suppose  the  weighting  procedure 
reflecting partial  reliance  on  each  aggregate 
leads to establishing an M1 target growth rate 
of  5 per cent and an M2 target growth rate of 
12  per  cent.'  The  relation  between  M1  and 
GNP in  (2) implies that  M1  growth  of  5  per 
cent  would  result  in  GNP  growth  of  11  per 
cent,  slightly  lower  than  the  desired  GNP 
growth  rate  of  12  per  cent.  The  relation 
The combination of  a 5 per cent growth rate target for 
M1 and a  12 per cent  growth  rate  target for  M2  results 
from equal weighting of  M1 and M2. If  M1 and M2 are 
considered to be equally effective as policy guides, the best 
estimate  of  the  GNP  growth  rate  resulting  from  policy 
actions necessary to achieve 5 per cent  M1 growth and 12 
per cent M2 growth is the average of  the GNP growth rates 
indicated by the M1 and M2 relations in (2) and (3). Thus, 
where  E(GNP)  is  the  expected  value  of  GNP  growth 
resulting from given M1 and M2 growth rates. It can easily 
be shown from the expression above that the only consistent 
set of targets that yields an expected GNP growth rate of  12 
per cent when M1 and M2 are weighted equally is an M1 
growth rate of 5 per cent and an M2 growth rate of 12 per 
cent.  More generally, the expected GNP growth  resulting 
from  any  set  of  consistent  targets can  be  determined  by 
weighting the predicted outcomes from each of  the reduced 
form relations by  the likelihood of  their occurrence.  There 
is, in fact, always some consistent set of  targets that leads 
to expected GNP growth  at the desired  rate  regardless of 
the relative weights given M1 and M2. 
between  M2  and  GNP  in  (3), on  the  other 
hand, implies that M2 growth of  12  per  cent 
would  lead  to  GNP  growth  of  13  per  cent, 
slightly above the desired rate.  Neither the M1 
nor  the  M2  relation  indicates 'that  policy 
actions necessary to achieve growth rates of  5 
per cent for M1 and 12 per cent for M2 would 
result in precisely the GNP growth rate that is 
desired.  Neither  of  the  relations,  however, 
indicates that  a  policy  'based  on  this  set  of 
targets would  lead to errors as great  as those 
that  could  occur  in  the  case  of  exclusive 
reliance on one aggregate. Thus, the possibility 
of  major  policy  errors  is  reduced  by  partial 
reliance  on  each  of  the  estimated  relations 
between GNP growth and monetary growth. 
Determinants of  the Weights for 
MI  and M2 
The relative weights assigned to M1 and M2 
would depend on their relative effectiveness as 
policy guides and on the degree to which policy 
is designed to avoid large errors.  Suppose, for 
example, that M1 is considered  to be a  much 
more effective policy  guide than M2 and  that 
the risk of  committing major policy  errors  by 
disregarding the behavior of  M2 is acceptable. 
In  these  circumstances, 'exclusive  reliance on 
M1 as a policy guide would be appropriate. If, 
on the other hand, M1 and M2 are considered 
equally effective as policy guides and  policy is 
designed  to  minimize  the  possibility  of 
substantial  deviation -from  the  desired  GNP 
growth  rate,  equd weighting of  Ml and  M2 
would be appropriate. 
Pis demonstrated above, the,degree to which 
a monetary aggregate would  be effective  as a 
policy  guide  depends  on  how  closely  the 
aggregate is  related to GNP. The closeness of 
the relation between a'monetary aggregate and 
GNP  can  be  measured  by  the  predictive 
accuracy of  a reduced form GNP equation that includes  the  monetary  aggregate  as  an 
independent variable. Thus, if  the  prediction 
errors were  about the same for  the  GNP/Ml 
equation as for the GNP/M2  equation, equal 
weights  would  be  given  to  M1  and  M2  in 
determining  the  monetary  targets  most 
conducive  to  attainment  of  ultimate  policy 
goals. 
ESTABLISHING MULTIPLE TARGETS 
TO REFLECT LIQUIDITY 
A  second  possible  reason  for  establishing 
target growth rates for both M1 and M2 is that 
a  monetary  measure  based  on  some 
combination of  M1 and  M2 may  be a  better 
policy guide than either aggregate individually. 
One such measure is a monetary aggregate that 
is defined as a weighted average of  M1 and M2, 
or equivalently, as  a  weighted  average of  M1 
and the time deposit component of  M2.O  This 
type of weighted monetary aggregate might be 
more closely related to GNP than either M1 or 
M2.  If,  for  example,  total  liquidity  is  an 
important  determinant  of  economic  perfor- 
mance, the various components of  M1 and M2 
would affect the economy in proportion to the 
degree  of  liquidity  they  provide.  In  these 
circumstances, a weighted  aggregate reflecting 
the relative liquidity of  M1 assets and the time 
deposit component  of  M2 might  be  a  better 
policy guide than either MI or M2 separately. 
can be determined  by  including the weighted 
aggregate  as  the  monetary  measure  in  a 
reduced form GNP equation.  Having obtained / 
estimates of  the parameters, the reduced form 
relation can be used to derive an estimate of the 
growth rate of  the weighted  average monetary 
aggregate  necessary  to  achieve  the  desired 
growth rate of GNP. Assume, for example, that 
the estimated relation  between  GNP and  the 
weighted aggregate is: 
where M'W  is the growth rate of  the weighted 
average monetary aggregate. 
The relation in (5) implies that an 8 per cent 
growth rate in the weighted  average monetary 
aggregate is necessary to achieve the desired 12 
per cent growth rate in GNP (i.e.,  12 = 6.4 + 
(0.7)  (8)). Since the weighted aggregate, MW, 
is  assumed  to be  a  weighted  average  of  M1 
assets and the time deposit component of  M2, 
the short-run  monetary objectives implied  by 
the use of  this type of  monetary measure as a 
policy guide can be expressed as target growth 
rates  for  M1  and  M2.  According  to  the 
estimated  relation in  (5), M1  and  M2 target 
growth  rates  that yield  an 8 per cent growth 
rate  of  the  weighted  average  monetary 
aggregate are most conducive to attainment of 
ultimate policy goals. 
A Method for Determining Desirable  Weighting MI  and M2 to Ensure 
MI  and M2 Growth Rates  Consistent Targets 
The  closeness  of  the  relation  between  a  Interdependence between M1 and M2 growth 
weighted average monetary aggregate and GNP  rates  must  be  taken  into  account  in  setting 
targets that would  yield  the desired growth in 
liquidity. As  in  the uncertainty case discussed 
8 A good summary of the  literature on weighted  average  previously, a weighting procedure can  be used 
monetary  aggregates can  be  found  in  Alfred  Broaddus,  to  ensure  that  the  M1  and  M2  targets  are 
"Aggregating  the  Monetary  Aggregates:  Concepts  and 
Issues,w Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond  consistent.  Unlike  the  uncertainty  case, 
Review,  November/December 1975.  however,  the  weighting  procedure  does  not 
10  Federal Reserve Bank  of Kansas City  Economic Review  February 1978 require a compromise between the desired M1 
and  M2 growth  rates.  A  compromise  is 
unnecessary  because  there  are  numerous 
combinations of  M1 and M2 growth rates that 
would  yield  the  desired  growth  rate  in  the 
weighted  average  monetary  aggregate.  All  of 
these combinations are equally  acceptable as 
targets. Thus, the weighting procedure in  this 
case  is  used  only  to determine  which  of  the 
acceptable combinations of  M1 and M2 growth 
rates would result in a consistent set of targets. 
The example in the preceding section can be 
used  to illustrate  how  a  weighting  procedure 
can  be  used  to determine  consistent  targets. 
The relation in (5) indicates that an 8 per cent 
growth  rate  in  MW  would  be  required  to 
achieve the desired 12 per cent growth  rate of 
GNP.  Assume that the weights assigned to M1 
and M2 in defining MW imply that the growth 
rate of  MW is equal to the simple average of 
the M1 and M2 growth rates (MW = .5 M1 + 
.5  M2). Combinations of  M1 and M2 growth 
rates that yield an 8 per cent growth rate in the 
weighted aggregate might then include an  MI 
growth rate of  7 per cent  and  an  M2 growth 
rate of 9 per cent, an M1 growth rate of  4.6 per 
cent and an M2 growth rate of  11.4 per cent, 
and  M1 and  M2 growth  rates  of  8 per cent. 
Each  of  these  combinations-and  numerous 
others+ould  serve  equally well  as  monetary 
targets. Only one combination, however, would 
satisfy the relation posited in  (4) which  states 
that there is  an  interdependence between  MI 
and  M2  growth  rates.  The  only  consistent 
combination of  M1  and M2 growth rates that 
provides the desired 8 per cent growth in MW 
is an M1 growth rate of 4.6 per cent and an M2 
growth  rate of  11.4 per cent  (i.e.,  11.4 = 4.5 
+  (1.5) (4.6) as  required  by  the  relation  in 
(4)). These  growth .rates would  then  be ,the 
target  growth  rates  chosen.  Thus,  the 
interdependence between  M1  and  M2 growth 
rates can be taken into account in establishing 
monetary targets by  choosing  the  unique 
combination of  consistent M1 and' M2'groHitli 
rates that result in the desired  growth  in the 
weighted average monetary aggregate.>' 
Even  though  a  compromise  of  short-run 
monetary objectives is-not necessary in the case 
where  MI and  M2 targets  are  established  to 
reflect the relative liquidity of  different assets, 
the  interdependence  of  MI  and-'M2 growth 
rates still requires that a weighting procedure 
be  used  to determine  monetaryt targets.  The 
weights assigned.to the components of  M1 and 
M2 in constructing MW  necessarily determine 
the relative importance given to.M1 and M2 in 
achieving the.  monetary -growth?most  . conducive 
to attainment of  ultimate  policy  goals.  Thug 
the  weighting  procedure  usedt to .establish 
consistent monetary targets is derived from the 
weighting  procedure  used  tor define  the 
weighted  aggregate  -  that  a  serves '  as  a  'policy 
guide.  As  in  the. .case of.  weighting ' monetary 
aggregates to reflect the1relative,  confidence in 
M1  and  M2 as  policy  guides,  the  weighting 
procedure  used ..when  a' weighted  average 
monetary aggregate is the policy guide could be 
based on.exclusive concern with.  one ,aggregate 
or on  partial .weighting .of .both M1  and  M2 
growth rates.  '  .  .,,  .  ,...  . .  ."  ,:'  , 
The  same weighting procedure that  is  used to establish 
M1  and M2  targets can be used in responding to deviations 
from those targets. Since the monetary targets are assumed 
to be derived from  the  desired growth  rate of a  weighted 
average aggregate, deviation of either M1 or  M2  from  its 
target would result  in  an  undesired-change in  the growth 
ra$e of  the  weighted  average  aggregate, unless  offset  by, 
policy actions. The  interdependence betyeen M1 and M2 
growth rates does not;  how&er,  require a compromise of 
the  liquidity  objective:.,By 'increasing  open -market 
purchases in  response to a slowdown in  the-gro-wth of one 
or  both  aggregates, for  example,  it  is  always  possible  to 
achieve an average growth of M1 and M2  consistent with 
the  desired  growth  in  the  weighted  aggregate.,  The 
,magnitude of offsetting  policy  actions  necessary ,to 
compensate for deviations from M1 or M2  targets can ,be 
determined by  using  the  same  weights for  M1 and  M2 
growth rates as were used in establishing the initia1,targets. Determinants of the Weights for 
MI  and M2 
In general, the weights given to M1  and M2 
in constructing the weighted average monetary 
aggregate  would  depend  on  the  relative 
liquidity of  M1 assets  and  the  time  deposit 
component of  M2.  Although  the  relative 
liquidity of M1  assets and time deposits cannot 
be measured directly, it can be  inferred from 
the public's  reaction to changes in the relative 
yields  on  assets.  For  instance,  if  individuals 
consider the interest rate on time deposits to be 
the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  demand 
deposits  and  currency,  the  yield  on  time 
deposits  measures  the price  of  obtaining 
additional  liquidity.  The  degree  to  which 
households and businesses substitute noninter- 
est-bearing assets for time deposits in  response 
to a change in the rate paid on time deposits 
indicates the public's  perception of  the relative 
liquidity of the two types of assets. lo 
CONCLUSION 
An  important  conclusion  of  the  foregoing 
analysis  is  that  there  are  numerous 
circumstances  in  which  it  is  desirable  to 
consider the behavior of  both M1 and  M2  in 
implementing monetary policy.  Exclusive focus 
on  either M1 or  M2 might lead  to incorrect 
policy  actions  if  there  is  uncertainty  about 
which aggregate is more closely related to GNP 
or if a weighted average of M1  and M2  is more 
closely  related to GNP  than  either  aggregate 
individually. In both cases, policy actions based 
on targets for both M1 and M2  are more likely 
10 For  a  comprehensive survey  of  the  studies that  have 
estimated the substitutability between M1  assets and  time 
deposits, see Edgar L  Feige and Douglas K. Pearce, "The 
Substitutability of Money  and  Near-Monies:  A  Survey  of 
the  Time  Series  Evidence," Journal  of  Economic 
Literature, Vol. 15, No. 2 (June 1977). 
to result in attainment of  ultimate policy goals 
than policy actions based on a single target. 
Another  implication of  the  analysis  is  that . 
the  evaluation  of  the  economic  impact  of 
alternative combinations of  M1  and M2  target 
growth  rates and  the relative  importance 
assigned  to  each  aggregate  depend  on  the 
rationale  underlying  the  use  of  multiple 
targets." If targets are established for both M1 
and M2  because of  uncertainty as to which  is 
the better policy guide, the potential economic 
impact of  each aggregate is evaluated without 
reference  to  the  behavior  of  the  other 
aggregate.  The  effect  of  M1  on  GNP  is 
evaluated  by  using  a  reduced  form  relation 
including M1 as the  sole  monetary  variable, 
and the effect of  M2  on GNP is  evaluated by 
using a reduced form relation including M2  as 
the sole monetary variable. Potential impact of 
a  particular  M1 target  growth  rate,  for 
example, can be determined directly from the 
M1 reduced form relation and does not depend 
in  any  way  on  the corresponding  M2  target. 
The  relative  importance  attributed  to  each 
aggregate in  the uncertainty case  reflects  the 
relative confidence  in  the  alternative  reduced 
form  relations  as  accurate  representations  of 
the effect of policy actions on the economy. 
If  targets  are established for  both  M1 and 
M2  because both are be!ieved  to contribute to 
total liquidity, on the other hand, the potential 
economic impact of  a particular  target growth 
rate for one aggregate cannot  be evaluated in 
isolation from the corresponding target growth 
rate of  the other aggregate. When GNP growth 
is  assumed  to depend  on  the  growth  in  total 
liquidity rather than the growth in either M1 or 
M2  individually,  the economic impact  of 
alternative sets of  M1 and M2  growth  rates is 
determined by  the combined impact of the M1 
and M2  growth rates on the growth in liquidity. 
Thus, the relative importance attributed to M1 
and  M2,  in  these  circumstances,  depends  on 
12  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Economic Review  February 1978 the degree to which each aggregate contributes 
to the desired growth in total liquidity. 
In summary, when short-run monetary policy 
decisions are based on target growth rates for  -  - 
M1  and  M2,  the  course  of  monetary  policy 
depends both on the method used  to evaluate 
the economic effects of alternative MI and M2 
11  The optimal structure of  reserve requirements on bank 
deposits also depends on the reason for establishing targets 
for both M1 and  M2.  The relative  magnitude of  reserve 
requirements on demand deposits and time deposits is  an 
important determinant of the degree of  monetary  control 
exercised by the Federal Reserve. 
Under  -the  assumption  that the  Federal  Reserve  uses 
some  reserve  aggregate  as  the  instrument  of  monetary 
control, it can be shown that M1 growth can most easily be 
controlled  if  there  are  no  reserve  requirements  on  time 
deposits and that M2  growth can most easily be controlled 
if reserve requirements on time deposits are equal to reserve 
requirements  on  demand  deposits.  When  target  growth 
rates are established for both M1 and M2,  the structure of 
reserve requirements  most conducive to attainment  of  the 
dual monetary objectives would, under the assumption of a 
reserve aggregate instrument, include reserve requirements 
on time deposits that are neither zero.nor equal to reserve 
requirements  on  demand  deposits.  The optimal  relation 
between reserve requirements on different  classes of  bank 
deposits when targets are established for both M1 and M2 
depends  both  on  the  reason  for  establishing  multiple 
targets  and  on  the  relative  weights  assigned  to  those 
targets. The greater the weight given to M1 relative to M2, 
ceteris paribus,  the greater would be reserve requirements 
on  demand  deposits  relative  to reserve  requirements  on 
time deposits in  both cases,  since demand deposits are a 
larger component of M1 than of M2.  For any specified set 
of  relative  weights  for  M1  and  M2 growth  rates,  the 
differential  between  reserve  requirements  on  demand 
deposits and time deposits would be greater if those weights 
represent the relative confidence in  Ml and M2 as policy 
guides than  if  those  weights  represent  the-  relative 
contribution of the M1 growth rate and the M2  growth rate 
to the growth rate of total liquidity. Equal weighting of  M1 
and M2  growth rates, for example,  would  imply that the 
optimal ratio of  reserve requirements on demand deposits 
to reserve requirements on time deposits is about 6 in the 
uncertainty case and 3% in the liquidity case. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  the  structure  of  reserve 
requirements  most conducive  to  -monetary  control  would 
depend on the type of  policy instrument used.  Therefore, 
the results  in  the preceding  paragraph  might  be changed 
somewhat. if  it  is  assumed  that  something  other  than  a 
reskrie  aggregate  is  used  as the instrument  of  monetary 
control. 
growth  rates  and  on  the  relative importance 
attributed  to  each  aggregate.  Since  both  of 
these determinants of policy actions depend on 
the  rationale  underlying the  use  of  multiple 
targets, the policy actions deemed  appropriate 
under  the  uncertainty  rationale  might  differ 
from  the  policy  actions  deemed  appropriate 
under the liquidity rationale. 
Although  the  current  procedure  for 
implementing monetary policy  is  not  precisely 
equivalent  to  the  use  of  monetary  targets, 
several  interesting  comparisons can  be  made 
between  current  methods  for  implementing 
monetary  policy  and  those  that  might  be 
employed if  a strict  monetary target approach 
to policy were adopted by  the Federal Reserve. 
The policy implications of  the two  alternative 
reasons  for  establishing  targets  for  both  M1 
and  M2  have  been  shown  to  be  somewhat 
different.  These differences  are relatively 
minor,  however,  in  comparison  to  the 
difference  between  exclusive  reliance  on  one 
aggregate  and  partial  reliance  on  both 
aggregates.  Whether because of  uncertainty as 
to which  aggregate is  a  better  policy  guide or 
because  both  aggregates  are  believed  to 
contribute  to total  liquidity,  the  FOMC  has 
chosen not to rely exclusively on either  M1 or 
M2 in assessing the impact of  monetary policy 
on  the  economy.  Furthermore,  the  current 
method  of  implementing  monetary  policy  is 
roughly consistent with the method implied by 
either of  the reasons for using multiple targets 
discussed in this article.12 
12 It is  interesting  to note that the existing  structure  of 
reserve requirements,  too, seems roughly consistent with a 
monetary policy based on targets for both M1 and M2.  The 
average  level  of  reserve  requirements  on  member  bank 
demand deposits is approximately four times as high as the 
average level of reserve requirements on member bank time 
deposits.  While  this  ratio is  not  conducive  to maximum 
control  over  either  M1  or  M2 separately,  it  might 
contribute to the ability to achieve desired combinations of 
M1 and M2  growth rates. 